Abstract
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS

Introduction.
We consider theory and evidence on the resolution of financial distress. The setting is one of a simply-capitalized owner-managed project. Financial distress occurs when a shock to project value leaves the owner-manager with a reduced equity stake and hence poor incentives to manage the project. In response to the project value shock, the owner-manager has incentives to default on the debt payment. If default occurs the lender must decide whether to restructure the loan or foreclose.
In a restructuring, the lender must scale back the promised debt payments (recreate the manager's equity stake) to give the owner-manager incentives to maximize the value of the project. As an alternative to restructuring, foreclosure can occur. A well-capitalized buyer of a foreclosed asset provides her own equity stake, which allows the lender to capture a share of the project rents. The willingness to pay for the asset depends on the outsider buyer's wealth and management skill. The lender therefore forecloses when there exists a potential buyer that is both well-capitalized and sufficiently skilled at managing the project.
When deciding whether to default or not, the owner-manager anticipates whether the defaulted loan will be restructured or foreclosed. If a restructuring is anticipated, the owner-manager defaults and obtains debt forgiveness. If foreclosure is anticipated, the owner-manager does not default if the value of the equity stake exceeds the cost of keeping the loan current. However, if the value of the equity stake is sufficiently low, default and foreclosure occur.
Conditional on foreclosure the lender either sells the asset immediately or manages the asset to be sold at a later date. It is costly for the lender to carry the asset, since it is most effectively managed by industry experts with an equity stake in the project. When the pool of outside buyers is strong, the foreclosed asset is immediately sold since there is little gain from waiting for better-capitalized buyers to emerge. When there are no well-capitalized potential buyers, the lender forecloses and incurs the cost of carrying the asset in anticipation of a higher sales price in the near future.
A unique feature of the model is that the outcome of financial distress depends simultaneously on the size of the project value shock and potential buyer wealth. In particular, project value and potential buyer wealth interact to determine if and when default occurs and the lender's payoffs in default.
Default and foreclosure occur when project value shock is sufficiently large and the pool of outside buyers is strong. When the pool of outside buyers is strong, the foreclosed asset is sold to an outside buyer with the sale proceeds allocated according to the absolute priority rule. Thus, the decision to default is similar the optimal exercise of a put option, as in models following in the tradition of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . 1 In contrast, when the pool of outside buyers is weak, the borrower defaults since the lender has an incentive to forgive debt. In cases when the continuation value is positive, the borrower defaults "strategically" to obtain debt forgiveness. In other models of strategic default, such as Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) , Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) , transaction costs and taxes create incentives for strategic default. In this model, the incentive for strategic default varies with the wealth of potential buyers and occurs because investment incentives are only improved in a restructuring where the borrower extracts a large share of the rents.
Like Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Stromberg (2000) , we consider whether an asset is liquidated or reorganized conditional on default. In our model liquidation is avoided when: (1) the assets are worth more to the owner-manager in continuation, and (2) market conditions are such that lender gains associated with foreclosure and asset sale are low. In Stromberg (2000) and this model, the value of the assets in continuation depends on the expertise of the manager of the distressed asset (the continuation value is exogenous in Bulow and Shoven (1978) ). In Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Stromberg (2000) , the bank lender's share of the gains from avoiding liquidation is reduced by wealth transfers to other creditors and hence distressed assets can be sold to lower valued owners.
In contrast, in this owner-manager model, there is a single lender and hence there are no wealth transfers among creditors. Because a sizable equity stake is required to restore investment incentives, the gains from reorganization accrue largely to the owner-manager. Consequently, lender gains to an outside sale must be low (industry conditions in terms of management skill and wealth must be weak) for reorganization to occur. An interesting feature of the model is that distressed assets can be sold to less efficient managers even when there is a single lender, i.e. no lender coordination problems.
Payoffs to the lender from foreclosure are positively related to the liquidity of potential buyers, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . In their model, the well capitalized buyer makes better investment decisions than the distressed borrower. In our model, the gains from selling to an outsider occur because: 1) the buyer is more efficient at managing the asset than the incumbent borrower, or 2) the buyer's wealth is sufficient to compensate for (slight) management inefficiencies, thus paying the lender a sufficiently large share of the gains from improving the investment incentives. The lender prefers to sell the distressed asset to a well capitalized buyer in these cases, even when there are no impediments to a reorganization that improves the distressed borrower's investment incentives.
Unique predictions of our model emerge from the interaction of project value shock magnitudes, the relative efficiency of management, and the wealth levels of potential buyers as they impact endogenous default decisions and the outcome conditional on default. Specifically, the model yields two empirical predictions that are examined with the available data on financially distressed commercial real estate assets. First, the model predicts that the timing of the sale of foreclosed assets depends on current and expected levels of potential buyer wealth. Second, defaulted loans are more likely to be restructured versus foreclosed depends when the shock to project value is small, the wealth of potential buyers is low and incumbent management is more efficient than outside managers.
Model implications are tested with a data set of over 600 financially distressed commercial real estate assets covering the severe downturn and rebound in commercial real estate values during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The assets were all owner-managed, and the overwhelming majority had a single loan against the property.
The data indicate whether the distressed loans were reorganized or foreclosed, as well as the time span between foreclosure and the sale of the asset. Consistent with the model, restructurings involved debt right downs rather than exchanges of equity for debt. Proxies for the wealth of potential buyers, as well as cross-sectional differences in project value shock magnitudes and management intensity, are utilized for testing the model predictions regarding the restructuring-foreclosure decision and the timing of foreclosed asset sale.
The analysis of foreclosed asset sale timing is based on predictions that assets are sold relatively quickly when potential buyers are well-capitalized and delayed in the absence of wellcapitalized buyers. During the worst years of the real estate downturn (when potential buyer wealth was low), only about 12% of the foreclosed asset inventory were sold per annum. However, during 1993 and 1994, the years when the industry began an extended recovery, the lender sold 32% and 40% of its year-beginning inventory. The average time in inventory was longer for assets sold during this latter period, reflecting the delayed sale of assets obtained through foreclosure during the downturn.
Estimates of a proportional hazards model reveal cross-sectional patterns that are consistent with these time-series outcomes and show the time series results hold when controlling for other factors. For example, office properties, which experienced an especially severe industry shock, were sold at a slower rate than apartment properties, which experienced a much smaller shock.
The pattern of asset sales suggests that: (1) an adverse shock to wealth created a wedge between the fundamental value of assets and the price at which assets could be sold, and (2) the lender perceived that asset values would return to fundamental values as either well-capitalized outsiders entered the industry or insiders recapitalized. These findings complement existing evidence on the relation between industry liquidity and asset value. For example, Pulvino (1998) and Brown (2000) find a relation between the transacted prices of distressed assets and the financial condition of the seller and buyer, whereas we find that the timing of the asset sale depends on industry liquidity.
The data on the outcome of default -reorganization versus foreclosure -reveal that foreclosure occurred more frequently for loans that defaulted during the worst years of the downturn. These were years when it was also more difficult for the lender to sell foreclosed property. In contrast, restructuring was more prevalent as market conditions improved and there was a ready market for foreclosed properties. This outcome is consistent with endogenous borrower default; indeed, it is an outcome that is difficult to reconcile without appealing to endogenous default.
To understand our argument, suppose that default is exogenous. In this case, appealing to Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , an opposite pattern is suggested: conditional on default, lenders prefer restructuring when industry wealth is low and foreclosure when industry wealth is higher. Our data show that the deep downturn in commercial real estate values simultaneously reduced the wealth of potential buyers and made option-based default attractive to the borrower. Although lenders prefer restructuring when industry wealth is low, foreclosure rates were high since a large number of borrowers were willing to walk away from the assets. In contrast, during the recovery period, continuation values were higher and borrowers only defaulted when they anticipated a restructuring.
The choice to restructure versus foreclose is regressed against cross-sectional and time varying proxies for sector wealth and project value shock. The logit model estimations support the idea that restructuring conditional on default is negatively related to the strength of the market for foreclosed assets and positively related to the shock to project value. Logit model estimations and the analysis of the timing of the sale of foreclosed assets support the predictions of the model that, when potential buyer wealth is low, the lender prefers restructuring over foreclosure and delayed sale over foreclosure and immediate sale. Furthermore, the logit model estimates and the finding that a large proportion of the assets are foreclosed during the pronounced commercial real estate downturn suggest that potential buyer wealth and the size of the shock to project value also influence the decision to default in a manner consistent with model predictions.
Our model also predicts that projects that are foreclosed will have experienced, on average, worse pre-default operating performance than projects that are restructured. This occurs because the borrowers that anticipate a restructuring readily default, while borrowers that anticipate foreclosure default only when prospects are very dim. Stromberg (2000) also argues that foreclosed assets experience poor pre-default operating performance. In his setting poor performing assets are badly managed and liquidation transfers the asset to a more efficient operator. Note that our model is capable of addressing this cause and effect relation. However, in the context of our data, idiosyncratic management problems are unlikely to explain our finding that loans collateralized by poorly performing property sectors were more likely to be foreclosed. Rather, general equilibrium factors seem to explain the outcomes, which is a prediction that also nests within our model.
The data contain information about capital expenditures made by the lender to improve or reposition the foreclosed properties prior to asset sale. We find that the lender made capital expenditures on the order of three to four times that of a typical non-distressed owner-manager. This suggests that the financially distressed owners of eventually foreclosed properties significantly underinvested in property maintenance or were unwilling to make positive net present value investments to reposition the property in the face of changing market conditions. These results complement evidence presented by Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) that firm's reduce their capital expenditures following financial distress.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model of borrower and lender behavior for a financially distressed owner-managed project. Section 3 presents the data. A descriptive empirical analysis of the decision to foreclose versus reorganize and the decision to sell versus manage foreclosed property in-house is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides formal empirical tests of model predictions. The paper ends with a summary of the main findings.
A Model of Financial Distress for an Owner-Managed Project
In this section we model a financially distressed owner-managed project. Figure 1 depicts the financial distress process. Conditional on a negative shock to project value, in the first stage the owner either defaults or uses available cash to make the current loan payment. Then, conditional on default, the game moves to a second stage where the lender chooses to restructure or foreclose the loan. The third stage occurs if the loan is foreclosed. In this stage the lender chooses to manage the foreclosed asset in-house or sell the asset to an outside buyer.
Figure 1 Here
This section begins with a brief description of the model set-up. Then the lender's payoffs are derived. These payoffs determine the conditions under which the defaulted loan is restructured versus foreclosed, and when the foreclosed asset is sold to an outside buyer versus managed in-house. Lastly, conditions for borrower default are derived.
Model Set-up
Consider a project financed by owner-manager equity and outside debt. Owner-manager liability is limited to the value of the project. All agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of interest is zero. The debt contract calls for payments of P 0 at t=0 and P 1 at t=1. At t=0, the owner-manager has access to sufficient wealth that is not pledged as collateral against the loan to make the required payment, P 0 . The project's cash flows are realized at t=1 and depend on two factors: the observable state of the economy at t=0 and non-contractible investment made by the owner-manager at t=0. At t=1, the realized cash flows are distributed to the lender and owner-manager according to absolute priority.
Non-contractible investment by the owner-manager affects project value through its "likelihood of success." The t=1 cash flow is V+B if project fundamentals are strong and the project is successful, and V−B>0 if project fundamentals are weak and the project is successful. Cash flow is 0 if the project is unsuccessful. The ultimate success of the project is not revealed until some time after t=0 (but prior to t=1). When project fundamentals are strong the borrower does not default. However, when they are weak, payoffs are such that it is rational for the owner-manager to consider default. The financial distress game depicted in Figure 1 presumes a weak economy with project value shock, B. To streamline the analysis we assume that the terminal debt payment, P 1 , is greater than V/2. The probability that the project is successful is ρ, 0≤ρ<1, where ρ is chosen by the ownermanager with knowledge of the state of the economy. Non-contractible investment has a cost of C(ρ), which is increasing and convex as a function of ρ. The owner-manager makes her default-payment decision prior to making her investment at time t=0.
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Two related features of this model are (1) owner-managed projects are not financed with outside equity, and (2) debt restructurings involve debt forgiveness rather than debt-for-equity exchanges. Both of these features are observed in our sample of owner-managed projects with a single source of secured debt. The following discusses how the owner-manager's role in determining the probability of project success motivates the use of outside debt financing in the initial capital structure, as well as why distressed workouts involve debt forgiveness rather than debt-for-equity swaps.
In the formal model the costs of investment are exclusively borne by the owner-manager. Thus, C(ρ) can be thought of as the owner-manager's disutility of the effort she provides to maintain the asset. Investment effort distortions associated with raising outside capital are minimized when the difference between the contingent payoffs to the owner-manager are maximized; i.e., when the external capital provider holds a senior claim on the project's cash flows and the owner-manager is the sole residual claimant.
3 In a weak economy the underinvestment problem is acute, which motivates the lender to consider a financial restructuring that improves the borrower's investment incentives. The outside capital provider, the lender, must scale back her claim in order to improve the manager's incentives to supply effort. The manager's incentives to provide effort are not improved by the lender taking an equity stake in exchange for debt forgiveness. 2 This model is designed to capture the realistic possibility that exogenous factors affect the profitability of a project after the initial financing is sought. The agency problems associated with outside financing could be reduced by having the lender own the project until the state of the economy is revealed, and then sell a stake in the project to the owner-manager just prior to when the investment choice is made. However, forcing the owner-manager to have a stake in the project before the state of the economy is revealed may minimize moral hazard problems associated with the likely (unmodeled) situation that the owner has some private information about the success of the project. To address this issue, the model could be complicated by introducing asymmetric information and requiring the manager make an investment choice before the state of the economy is revealed and then again after the state of the economy is revealed. 3 More generally, the model is designed to capture situations where it is inefficient for the owner-manager to have a very small equity stake in the project; i.e., situations where it is inefficient to separate ownership from management. 4 Two important caveats are warranted. First, the outside capital provider's claim is referred to as a "debt contract." Since the cash flow is assumed to be zero when the project is unsuccessful, the financial contracts are simply a division of cash flow if the project is successful. If the payoff to an unsuccessful project was positive but less than the face value of the debt, then there would be a meaningful distinction between debt and equity claims, and distressed borrower incentives would be improved only with write-downs of the existing debt. The assumption that the cash flow is zero when the project is unsuccessful simply streamlines the exposition. Second, we have not shown that debt is an optimal contract in this setting. Outside debt financing provides better owner-manager investment incentives than outside equity financing. Innes
Conditional on default, the debt is either restructured or the asset is sold to another (outside) owner-manager. The outsider (potential buyer) has wealth of W that can be used along with debt financing to purchase the foreclosed asset from the lender. The existing manager is assumed to have no meaningful wealth to inject into the project in a restructuring, i.e. the manager invests nearly all available wealth to purchase the asset. The manager only has sufficient liquid assets to make the required coupon payment.
The assumption that the existing manager has no meaningful wealth to contribute to the project is made for two reasons. First, because the owner-manager is risk neutral and there is an underinvestment problem associated with outside financing, it is optimal for the owner-manager to contribute her entire wealth to the project. Second, and more important, the implications for allowing the owner-manager to have modest amounts of wealth to contribute in a restructuring do not change main conclusions of the analysis. Specifically, when the model is solved for the more general case where the existing manager has some level of wealth (see the Appendix), it is shown that the outcomes depend on the difference between the existing manager and outside manager's wealth. Thus, rather than specify the existing manager and outside buyer wealth, we normalize the existing manager's wealth to zero.
The level of W (sector wealth) and the size of the asset specific shock, B, are two of the three critical parameters that determinate of both the outcome in default (restructuring versus foreclosure) and the whether the borrower defaults. The third parameter, the efficiency or skill of the outsider buyer relative to the distressed owner-manager, is introduced below.
Owner-Manager Investment
The expected payoff to the owner-manager is a function of the investment provided, the state of the economy, and the amount of debt due at t=1. There are two potential long-run project managers:
the incumbent owner-manager or an outside owner-manager that acquires the project from the lender in foreclosure. Each has its own unique investment technology.
The amount of debt due at t=1, F, depends on the situation. If the incumbent does not default, then F=P 1 . If default occurs and the loan is restructured, then some debt is forgiven based on negotiations between the incumbent owner-manager and the lender. If the project is foreclosed and (1990) shows that debt financing (1) provides superior incentives and (2) is optimal with risk neutral agents. Dewatripont, Legros and Matthews (2002) show optimality of outside debt financing in the presence of moral hazard holds under more general conditions.
sold to an outside buyer, the amount of debt against the project depends on the managerial efficiency of the new owner-manager.
Given a weak economy, the expected payoff to the owner-manager at t=1 is
where i=1 indicates the incumbent owner-manager and i=2 indicates an outside investor. For ease of analysis the investment technology is assumed to take the form C i (ρ) = β i ρ 2 , where β i is scaled so that ρ≤1. Based on this structure, it is straightforward to show that the optimal investment is
when the numerator is positive; otherwise, ρ i (F) = 0. Owner-manager investment depends on the size of her residual equity claim when the project is successful (as seen in the numerator) and her management efficiency (as seen in the denominator).
Lender Payoffs From Restructuring and Foreclosure
We now consider the lender's payoffs from a restructuring versus a loan foreclosure that results in an immediate sale of the asset to an outside buyer. Later, the lender is allowed to temporarily manage the foreclosed asset in-house before selling it to an outside buyer.
In a restructuring the lender is assumed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the borrower. This occurs prior to the borrower making her coupon payment, P 0 , or her investment decision. The offer nullifies the original loan contract and stipulates the new amount of debt due at t=1. If the offer is accepted, no coupon payment is required and investment in the asset occurs based on the renegotiated debt payoff due at t=1. If the borrower rejects the offer, the loan is foreclosed.
The lender's optimal offer is a new debt payoff amount, F 1 , that maximizes
subject to the owner-manager's participation constraint
The solution to the lender's maximization problem yields
and
A critical aspect of a restructuring is that the owner-manager maintains a significant share of the rents from the project. In other words, the participation constraint in equation (3) is not binding.
The payoff to the lender from foreclosure and asset sale depends on the characteristics of the potential buyer at the time of foreclosure-specifically, W and β 2 . The most a potential buyer is willing to pay for the project is the market value of debt that can be borrowed against the asset plus her personal wealth, W, subject to a participation constraint. The maximum amount of debt that can be borrowed against the project at t=0 by the potential buyer is ρ 2 (F 2 )F 2 , as stated in Equations (4) and (5), where ρ 2 (F 2 * )F 2 * = (V-B) 2 /8β 2 . Thus, a potential buyer is willing to pay more for the project than the lender's expected payoff from a restructuring if
The actual wealth contributed as equity by the outsider is potentially limited by the following participation constraint:
Rearranging Equation (6) leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. An outside buyer with wealth W and efficiency parameter β 2 is willing to pay more for the financially distressed asset than the lender's payoff in restructuring if and only if
and the outside buyer's participation condition in Equation (7) is satisfied.
Notice that foreclosure and asset sale dominates restructuring whenever β 2 < β 1 (i.e., when the outside buyer is more efficient than the current owner at managing the project). When the outside buyer is less efficient than the incumbent at managing the asset, the necessary conditions expressed in equations (6) and (7) indicate that β 1 and β 2 must be such that 2β 2 /3≤β 1 <β 2 . If the outside buyer is extremely inefficient relative to the incumbent (β 1 <2β 2 /3), the lender will always prefer restructuring over foreclosure and immediate sale, no matter how wealthy the outsider is. More generally, recognize that the level of wealth, W, required to make an offer for the asset is increasing in β 2 − β 1 , implying diminishing economic rents to the outside buyer as the difference in owner-manager efficiency becomes larger.
There are three points regarding the model of the lender's payoffs from reorganization versus liquidation worth discussing. First, the model provides a different motivation than found in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) for selling assets to well-capitalized buyers. In Shleifer and Vishny (1992), wellcapitalized buyers purchase financially distressed assets because these buyers face smaller debt overhang problems and therefore have better investment incentives than the financially distressed firm.
In this model, the lender has the option to improve the financially distressed borrower's balance sheet and investment incentives by restructuring the debt. Because of this option, the lender only sells the asset to an outsider (rather than restructure the debt) when the outsider is willing and able to pay for a portion of the gains from improving investment incentives. Only sufficiently efficient and wealthy potential buyers are capable of paying for a sizeable portion of the economic rents in the project.
Second, the owner-manager captures the rents from improving investment incentives and avoiding foreclosure. The lender's inability to capture rents in a restructuring creates the potential for a foreclosure. Thus, in contrast to Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Stromberg (2000) , where the bank lender is motivated to foreclose because wealth is transferred to other lenders in a restructuring, in this owner-manager model inefficient liquidations can occur with only a single lender.
Third, conditional on default and the size of the project value shock B, the two factors that drive the decision to liquidate versus restructure are the wealth of outside buyers and the management efficiency of the outside buyer relative to the incumbent manager. Liquidation occurs when the equity stake that an outsider is willing to contribute to the project is larger than gap between the value of the asset run by the incumbent and a less-skilled outsider. The size of the project value shock, B, plays a relatively unimportant role in the lender's restructuring-foreclosure decisions at this point because it is exogenously given and is therefore sunk and common to all potential asset owners.
Managing the Asset In-House
The lender has the additional option of carrying the foreclosed asset in inventory rather than selling it immediately to an outside buyer. 5 The lender may wish to carry the asset because he
anticipates the industry will recapitalize in the near future, which implies increases in wealth and more competition among outside buyers. Carrying distressed collateral in inventory is costly, however, since the lender does not have a comparative advantage in asset management.
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Formally, we assume that the lender can repossess the asset at t=0 and manage it in-house until some point prior to t=1, at which time the asset is sold to an outside buyer. The cost of carrying the asset in inventory is K. For positive K, the lender only manages the asset when it perceives that the industry will recapitalize prior to t=1; otherwise, it is better off foreclosing and selling the asset immediately.
Let the expected wealth of the future outside buyer equal W t+1 which is assumed to at least W.
7
The assumption that W t+1 −W is non-negative appeals to the idea that industry wealth levels move toward a long-run equilibrium after a negative shock. In general, it may be that both higher W and lower β 2 entities emerge. For simplicity, we focus on W. Further assume that the outsider's participation constraint expressed in equation (7) is not binding at t=0, which implies that the lender's payoff increases one for one with the wealth of the outside buyer.
Given this setting, foreclosure and delayed sale dominates restructuring at t=0 when
Foreclosure and delayed sale dominates foreclosure and immediate sale when
To characterize the set of outcomes in terms of outsider buyer wealth at t=0 (the time of default), we further assume that: (1) W t+1 -W is decreasing in W; i.e., the industry recapitalizes faster when industry wealth is low and assets are priced low relative to fundamentals, and (2) W t+1 is 5 U.S. banks are subject to only modest holding period limits when taking equity in exchange for debt forgiveness (James (1995)). We are aware of no such limitations for insurance companies. 6 The lender's initial decision to provide debt financing reveals its desire to own a fixed claim against the asset rather than an equity stake in the project. 7 The case where W t+1 is greater than W is likely to occur because the shock to project value that leads to financial distress would generally adversely effect potential buyer wealth. When W t+1 is less than W the lender never delays the sale of a foreclosed asset. The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Appendix.
Borrower's Decision to Default
The decision to default depends on whether foreclosure or restructuring is anticipated as a result of default. When a restructuring is anticipated the borrower defaults since debt is forgiven. If the borrower defaults and the lender forecloses, the incumbent's payoff is zero. Consequently, if the incumbent anticipates that a default will result in foreclosure, she makes the contracted payment of P 0 to avoid default if and only if her equity position from continuation exceeds P 0 . Proposition 3 states the default condition.
Proposition 3. Default followed by foreclosure occurs when the owner-manager anticipates foreclosure in default and B > B
* , where
The critical default value, B * , depends intuitively on model parameters and is derived in the Appendix.
Clearly, the larger the shock to project value, the less likely it is that the owner-manager makes the current debt payment necessary to avoid default. Note that this critical value does not depend on outside investor parameters W or β 2 , since option-based default depends on incumbent specific circumstances. This does not imply that default is independent of W or β 2 , however, since the outcome of default depends on W relative to as a function of the productivity of the outside investor. W (
Model Summary and Empirical Implications
The model indicates that the shock to project value (B) and the liquidity of outside buyers (W)
largely drive the outcomes of the financial distress. Figure 2 takes the fully developed model and depicts realizations of B and W that result in: (a) no default (continuation), (b) default followed by a loan restructuring, (c) default followed by foreclosure and immediate asset sale, (d) default followed foreclosure and delayed asset sale.
Figure 2 Here
When the shock to project value is relatively small, such that B < B * , the owner-manager's continuation value is positive. However, if industry wealth is simultaneously low (W< W ( ), the borrower strategically defaults knowing that she can extract concessions through a debt restructuring.
If, on the other hand, W > , the borrower does not default. Industry wealth is sufficiently high so that foreclosure is valued more highly than a debt restructuring by the lender, which prevents strategic default from occurring. The analysis assumes that the distressed borrower has no wealth to contribute in a restructuring.
When this assumption is relaxed (see the Appendix) the implications are twofold. First, when the borrower has wealth to contribute to in a restructuring, then minimum level of potential buyer wealth required for the lender to prefer foreclosure over restructuring is higher, i.e. W and hence W ( increase.
Further, the borrower extracts fewer rents in a restructuring when she contributes wealth.
Second, since the distressed borrower may be forced to commit wealth in a restructuring, the incentives to default strategically are muted. When the borrower has no wealth to contribute, restructurings reduce the debt obligation and the borrower contributes no wealth. This dominates continuation for all values of B. If the borrower has wealth and competition forces her to contribute some wealth in a restructuring, then restructuring is not as attractive. Thus, for small values of B, strictly less than B*, the borrower finds it optimal to continue rather than default when a restructuring is anticipated.
One interesting implication of the model is that financially distressed projects that are foreclosed will, on average, have experienced worse pre-default operating performance than projects that are restructured. That is, the average value of B conditional on liquidation is greater than the average value of B conditional on a restructuring. Stromberg (2000) examines a set of bankrupt Swedish firms and finds that firms that are liquidated in bankruptcy have worse pre-bankruptcy performance than firms that are reorganized in bankruptcy. This finding is interpreted as evidence that poorly managed firms are more likely to be liquidated and sold to a better manager. The link between project performance and the probability of liquidation is potentially very different in our model.
Endogenous borrower default implies that poorly performing loans may be liquidated because borrowers with low continuation values do not find it rational to avoid a default that leads to liquidation.
Unique empirical predictions implied in our model follow from endogenous default in relation to the combined effects of project value shock magnitudes (B), relative management efficiency (β 1 ,β 2 ) and sector wealth (W). Conditional on foreclosure, the timing decision to sell foreclosed assets is predicted to depend on current and expected sector wealth levels in addition to the management efficiency of outside buyers. Furthermore, when the incumbent borrower is efficient at operating the asset, we predict that the restructuring−foreclosure outcome depends uniquely on the size of the shock, B, in addition to wealth levels and potential outside owner efficiency. In our model, like Stromberg (2000), relative management efficiency also plays a role in the restructuring-foreclosure outcome; however, our model includes a well-defined role for outside investor wealth and endogenous default.
Our model is also capable of providing unique explanations for time-series patterns of restructuring-foreclosure outcomes in which project value shock magnitudes and wealth levels change over time. For example, other models of financial distress cannot simultaneously explain why, when large systematic shocks occur to a sector, foreclosure tends to occur with greater frequency (optionbased default occurs and the lender holds assets in inventory), but when value and wealth levels begin to recover, restructuring is the more frequent outcome (strategic default occurs in anticipation of a restructuring).
Data Description and Market Overview
The Distressed Loan Sample
Model implications are examined using a data set of financially distressed commercial real estate loans originated by a large multi-line life insurance company. There is left-censoring as well as right-censoring of the data that affect the analysis. Some loans that were originated before 1986 experienced financial distress prior to the time in which loan status indicators were available. Availability of left-censored data would have increased the total number of defaulted loans and the lifetime default rate. There is also the possibility that some loans defaulted after 1995, which marks the end of our sample period. Our judgment is that left and right censoring do not present significant statistical issues, as commercial real estate markets were relatively healthy over the 1974-85 and post-1995 time periods (i.e., during the periods prior to the market crash and after the recovery). 9 Recall that there are 807 loan defaults in the data. A total of 631 restructured or foreclosed loans implies that 176 loans temporarily experienced financial distress and were resolved prior to a restructuring or a foreclosure.
restructurings, 70 were eventually foreclosed for a total of 412 foreclosures. The lender sold 270 of the 412 foreclosed loans prior to year-end 1995.
Detailed cash flow data are available on all restructured and foreclosed loans, and include all loan fundings and borrower payments. In the case of restructured loans, the data show any reductions in contractually specified payments. In the case of foreclosed loans, an estimated asset value is assigned to the property at the time of foreclosure. All revenues and expenses realized during the inhouse asset ownership period as well as the realized sales price at the time of asset sale are also available.
A review of the data and follow-up conversations with the lender provide information about the nature of the restructurings in financial distress. Restructured loan status codes and cash flow patterns indicate that the lender never took back an equity stake from a financially distressed borrower in return for reducing the loan balance. Instead, restructurings were simple write-downs. This is consistent with the model setting where restructurings must involve loan write-downs (without equity exchanges) in order to improve non-contractible investment incentives. The data further indicate that most defaults occurred prior to the maturity date of the loan. In these cases, debt restructurings did not typically extend maturity. Rather, a vast majority of the restructured loans were write-downs that lowered the required payments and effectively reduced the loan balance.
The Commercial Real Estate Downturn and Recovery
A large decline in US commercial real estate values occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This happened because of overbuilding and resulting credit problems that limited financing availability for borrowers (see Fergus and Goodman (1994) , Peek and Rosengren (1994), Brown (2000) ). The property type underlying each loan proxies for cross-sectional variation in the shock to project fundamentals (B). Table 1 shows peak-to-trough percentage changes in NCREIF index property values for the four core property types over the sample period. 12 The decline in property values is smallest for apartment properties and greatest for office properties. These outcomes reflect differences in economic fundamentals: apartment property was the least overbuilt of all property types during the sample period, whereas office property was the most overbuilt.
Table 1 Here
Property type and asset size proxy for differences in the asset's sensitivity to management quality. For example, apartment property tends to be generic and therefore not particularly management sensitive. In contrast, hotel is the most management sensitive property type in the data.
Larger assets tend to be more complex to operate than smaller assets, so are more sensitive to management quality. Table 2 shows that size and property type are correlated. Apartment and industrial property tend to be the smallest of the property types, whereas hotel and office properties tend to be the largest. 
Commercial Mortgage Contracting and State Foreclosure Laws
There is considerable uniformity in commercial mortgage contracting.
All of the loans we analyze are fixed-rate, fixed-payment mortgages with non-recourse clauses that limit the borrower's 11 The lead-lag phenomena is largely due to the lagged information content of rents together with large movements in fundamentals during this time period. Long-term leases are used to contract on space in commercial real estate markets. This means that current rent levels are weighted averages, reflecting current and historical spot rents. When changes to spot rents are large, current rent levels will be a lagging indicator of economic fundamentals. 12 The NCREIF index is composed of directly held (non-exchange-traded) commercial real estate primarily belonging to the four core property types (office, industrial, retail, multi-family).
liability to the secured collateral. The secured collateral in all cases is improved real estate. Many of the loans, especially those that were originated after 1980, are call-protected with maturities in the 5-15 year range. Loans are typically partially amortizing with amortization periods of 15-30 years. For example, a loan may have a 10-year term-to-maturity in which payments amortize over a 25-year time period.
A vast majority of the loans analyzed were originated at loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of between 71 and 75 percent. We find little variation in LTV ratio by property type. Further analysis indicates that LTV ratios at loan origination for restructured and foreclosed loans are similar to LTV ratios at origination for all originated loans. This suggests that economic or manager-specific factors, and not variation in financial structure as measured by LTV ratio, are the primary cause of financial distress.
State foreclosure laws govern the relationship between the lender and the borrower in a secured commercial real estate loan transaction, and ensure that an absolute priority ordering of creditors is observed (see Warren (1987) 
Descriptive Data Analysis
Default Frequencies, Restructuring-Foreclosure Outcomes, and the Timing of Foreclosed Asset Sales
To begin the formal empirical analysis, Table 3 displays defaulted loans by year of origination and year of onset of financial distress. The table shows that 807 of 2589 loans experienced financial distress during the 1986-95 time period, for a cumulative lifetime default rate of 32.5 percent. Annual default rates are persistently high during the 1986-90 time period, and peak 1991 at 6.3 percent (as seen in the total row near the bottom of the table). Default rates then decline quickly after the 1991 peak.
Table 3 Here
The table also shows the time-series of indexed REIT prices to provide a sense of industry liquidity and asset market fundamentals. REIT prices indicate deteriorating fundamentals in the late 1980s, with a bottom occurring in 1990 or shortly thereafter, followed by stabilized and improving market conditions. Defaults rates are seen to correlate closely with market conditions as proxied by REIT prices.
These results can be interpreted in the context of the model. High lifetime rates of default during our sample period suggest that property value shocks were both large and systematic.
Furthermore, high default rates in the face of deteriorating market conditions suggest low continuation values in the pre-1992 time period. The decline in default rates after 1991 coincide with improving market conditions, implying lower B (project value shock), higher W (industry wealth) values. This in turn suggests movement into the loan continuation region depicted in Figure 2 . Table 4 documents that a total of 342 loans were foreclosed and 289 loans were restructured in response to borrower default. The relatively high proportion of foreclosed loans may seem surprising given the simple capital structures and relative transparency of commercial real estate assets. Indeed, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) find that restructuring is more likely with firms that possess more tangible assets, more bank debt, and simpler capital structures. The frequency of foreclosure outcomes is less surprising in the context of our model, which emphasizes non-contractable owner-manager investment, industry wealth effects, and asset inventory management by the lender.
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The data in Table 4 are broken out by decision year, which is the year in which the restructuring-foreclosure decision was made. The striking result is that the lender was more likely to foreclose (restructure) defaulted loans when market conditions were deteriorating (improving) and default rates were increasing (decreasing). Specifically, during the 1986-90 time period, only 38 percent of the distressed loans were restructured, while during the 1991-1995 period the restructuring 16 Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) and Wang et al. (2002) also provide models that explain the co-existence of workout and foreclosure in mortgage markets. Riddiough and Wyatt focus on unobservable lender foreclosure costs and signaling with multiple borrowers to explain why a lender might prefer costly foreclosure outcomes. Wang et al. focus on borrower costs of default and screening costs incurred by the lender to distinguish between strategic and liquidity defaults.
rate increases to 56 percent. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. We will attempt to explain this result after briefly reviewing some foreclosed asset sale data. (1) the number of loans that were foreclosed during the year, (2) the number of properties sold during the year, (3) the number of properties obtained through foreclosure that remain in inventory at the end of the year, (4) the average number of months the asset was held in inventory before the property was sold, and (5) the propensity of the lender to sell foreclosed properties.
Table 5 Here
As noted earlier, there were 412 mortgage foreclosures during our sample period, with 270
foreclosed asset sales. Foreclosure activity peaked in 1991 and 1992, which roughly corresponds to the market trough of 1990-91 (the data indicate it takes 18 months on average to move from the onset of financial distress to loan foreclosure). Asset inventory peaks at year-end 1992, as foreclosure activity began to slow after 1992 and asset sales increased dramatically in 1993.
Asset sale propensities increase to over 30 percent in both 1993 and 1994, which correspond to a stabilized and improving commercial real estate asset market with substantial amounts of liquidity injected by REITs and other opportunistic investors. Average ownership period data (seen in column (4)) indicate that the properties sold in 1993 and 1994 were held in inventory for a relatively long period of time-31 and 27 months, respectively. This supports the idea that the lender waited until the sector recapitalized to sell assets that, presumably, would have been sold at depressed prices prior to 1993. A proportional hazards model of the timing of the sale of foreclosed assets is presented in the following section.
We are now in a position to address the time-varying restructuring-foreclosure relation noted in Table 4 . Given that the market for foreclosed assets was weak during the downturn and shortly after the market hit bottom, one might expect the lender to prefer restructuring over foreclosure during that time. The data in Table 4 show the opposite occurred-foreclosure happened more frequently than restructuring. This result can be explained by endogenous borrower default. During a downturn, the distribution for B (the project value shock variable) moves to the right and borrowers do not find it optimal to continue to make the loan payments required to avoid foreclosure. As a result, a greater proportion of defaulted loans are foreclosed.
Later in the sample period the lender restructured defaulted loans when default rates were declining and the lender appeared to have a ready market for foreclosed assets. Better market conditions imply that the distribution of B values moves inward, causing borrowers to prefer continuation over foreclosure. This results in a simultaneous drop in the default rate and increase in the restructuring rate as (1) more borrowers find it optimal to continue to make their payments, and (2) the borrowers that default often do so strategically because they anticipate restructuring.
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Other explanations for why more loans were reorganized when the market for distressed assets was stronger would require that the lender's gains from restructuring the loan versus foreclosure are larger for smaller B shocks. In this model there is no relation between the lender's gain from restructuring versus foreclosure and the size of B. Liquidation occurs when the equity stake that an outsider is willing to contribute to the project is larger than gap between the value of the asset run by the incumbent and a less-skilled outsider. Put another way, the size of the project value shock is common to all potential asset owners. 
Lender Capital Expenditures on Foreclosed Properties
The data allow us to measure capital expenditures incurred by the lender during the foreclosure-asset ownership period. Commercial real estate capital expenditures consist of major property maintenance expenses (such as replacing a roof), any redevelopment costs incurred to reposition the asset in the market, tenant improvements, and leasing commissions. Capital expenditure and inventory ownership period data are presented in Table 6 , where we provide detailed breakouts by property type, original loan size, and foreclosure year.
Table 6 Here
Monthly capital expenditures over the lender's foreclosed asset ownership period are first summed and then divided by the asset's sale price to produce a total capital expenditure percentage.
Average total capital expenditures are 14.2 percent of the asset's sale price. The average ownership period is 2.3 years, which implies annualized capital expenditures of 6.2 percent on average. This compares to annual capital expenditures of 1.5 to 2 percent on average made by non-distressed owners of commercial real estate (Fisher, et al. (2001) ). 18 Thus, capital expenditures made by the lender on foreclosed assets that were later sold were three to four times the level of capital expenditures made by non-distressed property owners.
The break-down in capital expenditures by property type shows that apartments (a low-shock sector) had relatively low levels of annualized capital expenditures, whereas office (a high-shock sector) had the highest levels of capital expenditure. When we break out capital expenditures by the year of foreclosure, we find that total capital expenditures and time-in-inventory during the 1986-90 time period are more than double that of the later period. These findings imply that significant investment was required on assets foreclosed when market conditions were especially poor, while the lender also delayed sale of foreclosed assets until market conditions improved.
The capital expenditures made by the lender on foreclosed assets thus provide direct evidence of underinvestment by financially distressed owners of commercial real estate and that foreclosed assets arrive in particularly poor condition. 19 The additional capital expenditures made by the lender potentially come from two sources. First, consistent with model predictions, the financially distressed borrower may have rationally deferred regular maintenance of the property prior to defaulting on the loan, knowing that the continuation value was low and the probability of foreclosure was high. This is consistent with the finding that underinvestment on foreclosed assets is more severe in large shock sectors.
Second, changing market conditions might have required a large capital outlay to reposition the property to maximize its value. Again, a financially distressed property owner would have limited incentives to make a significant investment in the property, since the benefits to reinvestment may be disproportionately shared with the lender. As evidence that capital expenditures were made to redevelop or reposition certain assets, of the 269 sold assets for which we have data, 67 incurred capital expenditures in excess of 20% of the sales price, 26 had capital expenditures in excess of 40% of asset sales price, and 3 incurred costs in excess of 100% of asset sales price.
These findings support evidence presented in Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) that firms reduce their capital expenditures following financial distress. Our evidence of underinvestment is somewhat more direct, in that we observe the change in capital expenditures when the asset is transferred to a well-capitalized owner.
Regression Analysis
In this section we use detailed loan data on restructuring-foreclosure decisions as well as on foreclosed asset sale outcomes to formally assess the model's comparative static predictions. Because the logical structure of the model is based on backward induction, we present the stage-3 (foreclosed asset sale timing) model specification and results first, and then follow with an analysis of stage-2 (restructuring versus foreclosure decision) outcomes.
The Timing Decision to Sell a Foreclosed Asset
Data on foreclosed asset sales allow for tests of predictions of the third stage of the model. To do this we specify a proportional hazards model of the time to asset sale. Using foreclosure data from assets that sold during the 1986-95 time period, the hazard model provides estimates of the probability of an asset sale in a particular quarter, conditional on a sale not yet having occurred. The probabilities implied in the coefficient estimates (a positive coefficient implies a higher probability of sale relative to the baseline) thus provide a method to assess model predictions. Cross-sectional and time varying proxies for potential buyer wealth and variables that control for other factors (non-model factors) that influence the time required to sell an asset are explanatory variables in the hazard model.
The model predicts that the lender takes longer to sell a foreclosed asset when industry wealth, W, is low. Specifically, the model suggests foreclosed assets are sold immediately when W is above a critical value. The sale of a foreclosed asset is delayed until W increases when W is below the critical value at the time of default. To proxy for industry wealth we assume that the natural buyers of distressed commercial real estate-the most efficient managers (those with the lowest β 2 values)-are existing commercial real estate owner-managers. These entities are likely to have experience owning and managing property types similar to those they are interested in buying. Property type thus proxies for cross-sectional variation in outside buyer wealth, in the sense that higher-shock sectors are predicted to experience longer times to asset sale.
REIT prices are a natural time varying proxy for the wealth of commercial real estate managers (see section 3.2 and Figure 3 ). REITs were used in the early to middle 1990s by seasoned real estate professionals as a vehicle to access capital and purchase distressed assets; consequently, access to liquidity was capitalized into REIT prices during that time. Higher REIT prices indicate greater wealth available to natural real estate buyers and therefore are predicted to result in faster times to sale.
We also include variables that measure the management specificity of the foreclosed asset since there are less skilled managers available for management intensive assets, i.e. the market is thinner, and it should take longer to match buyers and sellers regardless of the level of potential buyer wealth.
Hotel property is considered to be more management intensive than the other property types included in the sample, and therefore is predicted to take a longer time to sell. Estimated asset value at the time of foreclosure (the asset's transfer value) is also a proxy for management specificity, in that larger assets typically require greater management expertise. Larger assets also require more capital for acquisition purposes. Consequently, larger assets are hypothesized to result in a slower rate of asset sale.
Estimation results are reported in Table 7 . The REIT price coefficient is positive and highly significant: greater (lesser) potential buyer wealth reduces (increases) time-to-sale. Relative to office property, the omitted category, apartments experience a shorter time in inventory. This is as expected since the apartment property sector experienced the mildest shock to fundamentals, implying that there were many well capitalized potential buyers available. Neither the hotel nor transfer value coefficients are statistically significant. The hotel property finding may have been influenced by the slightly less severe shock in the hotel sector relative to office property, which has the offsetting effect of reducing time in inventory.
Table 7 Here
In sum, the hazard model results are broadly consistent with third stage model predictions.
Most importantly, the results indicate that the lender delays the sale of foreclosed assets when potential buyer wealth levels are lower and increases the rate of sales when potential buyer wealth levels are higher. These results (1) suggest the lender considers potential buyer wealth in the timing of the sale of an asset, and (2) complement the findings of Pulvino (1998) and Brown (2000) , who examine the transacted prices of distressed assets.
The Decision to Restructure versus Foreclose a Distressed Loan
Model implications are now examined in the context of whether a defaulted loan is restructured or foreclosed. Recall that the lender's restructuring versus foreclosure decision hinges on the tradeoff between correcting financing distortions through a costly loan write-down versus foreclosing and selling the asset to a more liquid but possibly less efficient outside investor. Model structure predicts that default resolution depends importantly on the magnitude of the shock to project fundamentals, B, the extent of asset management specificity, β 2 -β 1 , and wealth levels of outside buyers, W.
As shown in Figure 2 , when B is smaller, borrowers tend to default strategically in anticipation of a loan restructuring. When B is larger, borrowers tend to default because their continuation value is negative, implying a relatively high proportion of foreclosure outcomes. Thus, the proportion of loans that are restructured versus foreclosed depends on the distribution of B across the sample of financially distressed borrowers, where the model predicts that a larger proportion of defaulted loans are restructured (foreclosed) when the sample of borrowers experiences milder (more severe) B shocks.
Higher industry wealth, W, makes foreclosure more attractive to the lender. Identification is non-trivial, however, because B and W are highly correlated in the data, in that we focus on an industry that experienced a significant economic downturn that sidelined many experienced industry insiders.
The lender's level of inventory of foreclosed assets (i.e., the number of foreclosed assets held in inventory) is a compelling proxy for potential buyer wealth. Model predictions and previous evidence indicate that when the lender holds a large inventory of foreclosed assets, the market for distressed assets is weak. Thus, higher relative levels of asset inventory imply lower industry wealth and therefore an increased propensity to restructure.
Property type is used to proxy for variation in the depth of the project value shock, since, as seen in Table 1 , the link between asset value and property type is direct. Apartment property is a lowshock sector in relation to other property types, which, after accounting for the effect of endogenous borrower default, predicts a higher likelihood of restructuring.
REIT prices proxy for the wealth levels of potential buyers, as distinct from project value shock effects. Access to liquidity was capitalized into REIT asset prices during the sample period, as growth opportunities existed as they related to the purchase of distressed assets.
The model also predicts that assets that are more management specific (β 1 << β 2 ) are less likely to be foreclosed. As noted earlier, larger assets and hotel properties are more complex and manager specific. Thus, we expect the probability of foreclosure to be negatively related to initial loan size and the hotel property indicator variable.
The lender's propensity to foreclose versus restructure a defaulted commercial real estate loan is estimated with a logit model, with results reported in Table 8 . The model is estimated based on the sample of 631 financially distressed loans, in which the independent variable takes on a value of one if the loan was foreclosed (342 observations) and zero if the loan was reorganized (289 observations).
Table 8 Here
The coefficient on the beginning-period inventory variable is negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The lender is more willing to restructure a distressed loan when the market for foreclosed property is weak, as evidenced by a large inventory of foreclosed property. This also implies that the lender took into consideration the expected payoffs from carrying an asset in inventory when making its decision to restructure versus foreclose a defaulted loan.
The coefficient on the apartment property dummy variable is negative and statistically significant. The combined result that (1) a small proportion of apartment loans were foreclosed when the shock to the apartment sector was smaller and (2) foreclosed apartment properties were readily sold out of inventory is consistent with the idea that few apartment property owners found the value shock to be large enough to default when they anticipated that the lender would foreclose. Instead, the defaults that did occur were likely to be strategic, i.e. in anticipation of restructuring.
The REIT price variable (a proxy for time-varying wealth effects) is positive and significant.
These results are consistent with model predictions in the sense that a high-B, high-W combination is predicted to result in a foreclosure, whereas a low-B, low-W combination is predicted to result in a restructuring (see Figure 2) . These results are unlikely to be explained by the models of Stromberg (2000) and Habib and Johnsen (1999) , which predict that defaulted loans are more likely to be liquidated because the managers are less capable.
The coefficients on both variables proxies for management specificity, Hotel and Loan Size, are negative and statistically significant. This supports the contention that incumbent owner-managers are generally more efficient than outside investors at managing the asset, and therefore that the investment distortion-outsider wealth tradeoff is relevant to the lender when considering whether to restructure or foreclose a loan.
In summary, the logit model estimation results provide empirical evidence in support for the model developed in section 2 of this paper. Specifically, the data suggest that: (1) default decisions by the borrower are endogenous and depend importantly on the size of the shock to project fundamentals, and (2) the lender considered the wealth of potential buyers in the restructuring-foreclosure decision.
Conclusion
This paper provides a model of a financially distressed owner-managed project. Several key elements drive the model. First, a project-level shock is realized to cause financial distress and a debt overhang problem. The need to restore proper investment incentives force the lender to either forgive some debt through a restructuring or foreclose. Restructuring is more attractive when significant goingconcern value exists due to the relative efficiency of the incumbent owner-manager and when the pool of buyers for the foreclosed asset is thin and wealth constrained. Because of the lender cannot capture a large part of the gains from reorganization, foreclosure is increasingly preferred as outsider wealth and the efficiency of outside buyers increase. These features explain the co-existence of restructuring and liquidation in the data, and why transparent and simply capitalized owner-managed firms are frequently liquidated in financial distress.
If the borrower anticipates that default will lead to debt forgiveness, a strategic default occurs.
If the borrower anticipates that the defaulted loan will be foreclosed, default only occurs when the project's continuation value (equity position) is worth less than the cost of keeping the loan current.
Thus, potential buyer wealth and the size of the shock to project value interact to determine when the borrower defaults and the outcome of default.
Asset value is endogenous in our model because owner-manager investment is endogenous and because industry market conditions vary to affect the realized sales price of foreclosed assets. Our approach thus references and extends Titman et al. (2001) , who, in an owner-managed project setting, focus on underinvestment with non-discretionary liquidation as an explanation for endogenous asset values and borrower default decisions.
Because our model recognizes that borrower default is endogenous, it produces very different predictions than Shleifer and Vishny (1992) as to the resolution of financial distress. Shleifer-Vishny would predict a higher proportion of restructurings during a market downturn and a higher proportion of foreclosures as market conditions improve, since fire sale discounts vary with industry conditions.
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We nest Shleifer-Vishny predictions among a larger set of possible outcomes. For example, our model would predict a strict preference for foreclosure when firm-specific shocks are unrelated to sector-wide conditions, perhaps because incumbent owner-manager inefficiency causes or exacerbates a firmspecific shock. In an alternative setting with efficient incumbent owner-managers and highly correlated firm-specific and sector-wide shocks, a different pattern of restructuring and foreclosure outcomes occur.
Although the lender might unconditionally prefer to restructure (foreclose) when market conditions are deteriorating (improving), endogenous borrower default can reverse the realized outcomes: our model allows foreclosure to occur more frequently when market conditions are deteriorating and restructuring to occur more frequently when conditions are improving.
This latter pattern of restructuring-foreclosure outcomes is observed in a unique data set of financially distressed commercial real estate mortgages. The data correspond to a severe downturn and subsequent recovery in commercial real estate experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Detailed data exist on the lender's restructuring-foreclosure decision as well as the lender's foreclosed asset sale timing decision. We also have observations on default realizations by year of loan origination and year of onset of financial distress. The data support many of the predictions of the model, including the existence of endogenous borrower default, significant underinvestment on foreclosed assets, and delayed asset sales in response to weak industry conditions.
Appendix
This appendix begins with an analysis of the second and first stages of the game when the distressed borrower (the incumbent manager) has personal wealth greater than zero to invest in the project, i.e. the general case. The incumbent manager's personal wealth is denoted W I and the original debt financing is assumed to be non-recourse. Specifically, proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 are provided for the general case. Finally, a proof of Proposition 2 is provided.
Proposition 1 in the general case.
In this setting, we suppose that, conditional on default, the lender holds an auction for the asset.
The distressed incumbent manager can obtain outside financing from another lender or renegotiate with the existing lender. In either case, the maximum amount that the distressed incumbent manager is willing to pay for the asset follows directly from equations (4) and (5). Specifically, the distressed incumbent manager is willing to pay up to W I + (V-B) 2 /8β 1 for the asset assuming the participation constraint is binding. Thus, the condition necessary for the asset to be sold to an outsider is
This result is very similar to equation (6) and, assuming the participation constraint is satisfied for the incumbent (i.e. equation (7)), the condition under which an outside buyer is willing to pay more for the asset than the lender's payoff in a restructuring is
Thus, in the general model foreclosure occurs when condition (A.2) holds. In the general model, foreclosure occurs when the difference between the potential buyer's wealth and the distressed ownermanager's wealth is sufficiently large to overcome the relative inefficiency of the outside manager.
It is important to note that when the distressed owner-manager has wealth, she may be required to contribute some wealth in a restructuring to win the auction. In particular, if (A.2) does not hold, the distressed borrower must contribute W * in a restructuring to win the auction where
In summary, to the extent that W I is greater than zero, (1) restructurings are more likely and (2) the lender captures a greater share of the rents in a restructuring.
Proposition 3 in the general case. Now, we turn to the decision to default. The following demonstrates the conditions under which the borrower chooses to default. The borrower defaults when the payoff from continuation is less than the payoff in default. The borrower's payoff from continuation is
If the borrower defaults, the lender can either foreclose on the loan which results in a zero payoff to the borrower or the loan is reorganized. The borrower anticipates that foreclosure will occur when equation (A.2) is satisfied. Thus, the borrower defaults when foreclosure is anticipated for all B greater than B* where
Solving equation (A.4) results in the condition for default when foreclosure is anticipated that is provided in Proposition 3. The condition presented in Proposition 3 for when the borrower avoids default when foreclosure is anticipated does not depend on the level of owner-manager wealth because neither the owner-manager's payoff in continuation or foreclosure depend on W I .
The borrower payoffs in reorganization depend on W I and W. In the case presented in the text, W I = 0, the debt is restructured to a level F 1 * . Since, F 1 * is less than P 1 , it is always the case that
Thus, as stated in the text, the borrower always defaults in the case where (1) the incumbent has no wealth and (2) the borrower anticipates reorganization.
In the case where W I is positive, the payoffs in a restructuring maybe reduced because the distressed borrower must contribute some funds as shown in (A.3). Thus, the borrower does not default for all realizations of B. The shock must be sufficiently large to make restructuring dominate continuation. However, a smaller shock is required to trigger default when reorganization is anticipated than when foreclosure is anticipated. The shock to trigger default followed by restructuring is smaller than B* because the borrower payoffs are greater than zero in a restructuring.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Two cases need to be considered: (1) (8) or (9) hold and restructuring is again the lender's best strategy. If W > W the equation (8) is satisfied but (9) is not. Thus, the lender prefers to foreclose and sell the asset immediately.
In (8) and (9) do not hold, and the lender prefers to restructure. If W ( < W < then both Equations (8) and (9) are satisfied, and the lender's best strategy is to foreclose and hold the asset for later sale. If W > , then
Equations (8) is satisfied but Equation (9) is not. Thus, the lender prefers to foreclose and sell the asset immediately. Table 1 shows the percent decline in asset values from the peak of the property cycle prior to the real estate downturn through the trough of the cycle for four core property types: Apartment, Office, Retail, and Industrial. Asset value changes are calculated using NCREIF index data. Table 3 displays lifetime and annual default rates from 1986-95 for 2589 commercial mortgage loans originated by the lender. A total of 807 loans were classified as in default at some point during the sample period. The year of onset of financial distress is the year in which a loan was first reported as 90 days or more delinquent on its loan payments. Rows identify defaults by year of origination to determine a lifetime default rate. Columns identify the year in which a default occurred to provide an annual default rate. The indexed values of REIT price and REIT rent (with a one-year lead) are shown in the bottom two rows, where 1985 has an index value of 100. Table 4 presents the number of defaulted loans that were restructured versus foreclosed by decision year. The decision year refers to the year in which a restructuring occurred or foreclosure proceedings were initiated. The restructuring rate is the number of loans restructured in a year as a percentage of the total number of restructured and foreclosed loans in that year. We combine years 1986-88 because few loans were classified as restructured in 1986 and 1987.
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Table 4 Restructured Versus Foreclosed Loans by Decision Year
Decision Year
Number of Restructured Loans
Number of Foreclosed Loans
Restructuring Rate Table 5 documents foreclosure and sales activity on foreclosed assets over the 1986-95 sample period. Specifically, the table shows: (1) the number of loans that were foreclosed during the year, (2) the number of repossessed properties sold during the year, (3) the number of properties obtained through foreclosure that remained in inventory at the end of the year, (4) the average number of months between the foreclosure date and the property sale date, and (5) the propensity of the lender to sell assets, as measured by the number of properties sold in a year as a percentage of the inventory of foreclosed properties at the prior year-end. Table 6 Lender Capital Expenditures on Foreclosed Property Table 6 presents capital expenditures made by the lender on 269 repossessed assets that were later sold (one observation was excluded due to missing data) during the inventory ownership period as a percentage of the asset sale price. We also calculate the average length of the equity ownership period in months as well as annualized capital expenditures, defined as the total average capital expenditure percentage divided by the average ownership period. Data are reported for the entire sample as well as six property type categories, seven original loan size categories, and two foreclosure-year periods. The negative capital expenditure reported in the Other property type category is due to a sizable capital expenditure reserve that accompanied a foreclosed property, which proved to be more than sufficient to fund actual capital expenditures during the asset ownership period. Table 7 reports coefficient estimates from a proportional hazards model of the time to repossessed asset sale. The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the repossessed asset is sold during a particular quarter and zero if the repossessed asset remains in the lender's inventory. The sample includes only foreclosed assets that were actually sold by the end of the 1995. Sample size is 241, as 29 observations were excluded due to missing values. Standard errors for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance based on the Wald Chi-Square measure: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. Several additional variables are included as controls in the specification (the coefficient estimates are not reported). These variables are a Bankruptcy dummy variable, indicating if the loan was part of a larger bankruptcy proceeding; a Lender Financing dummy variable, indicating whether the lender provided purchase money financing as part of the asset sale transaction; and a Package Sale dummy variable, indicating if the asset sale was part of a bulk (multi-asset) sale transaction. Table 8 presents logit model coefficient estimates of the lender's decision whether to restructure (0) or foreclose (1) a defaulted commercial mortgage loan. There are a total of 289 restructured loans and 342 foreclosed loans in the data set. Standard errors for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance based on the ChiSquare Score measure: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. In addition to the variable coefficient estimates reported in the table, the following variables are included as controls (the coefficient estimates are not reported): Loan-to-value ratio at loan origination; Debt service coverage ratio at loan origination, defined as net operating income divided by debt service; Loan term-to-maturity at origination; Loan age at the onset date of financial distress; Borrower type-individual, Borrower type-partnership, Borrower type-other; a dummy variable indicating if Judicial Sale (as opposed to Power-of-Sale) foreclosure law applies; a Second Mortgage dummy variable, indicating if the borrower had a secondary source of debt financing; and a Bankruptcy dummy variable, indicating if the loan was part of a larger bankruptcy proceeding. 
Property
